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Abstract. This article aims to analyze the interbank lending adjustment during the 
period when Vietnamese commercial banks are compliant with some parts of the 
Basel regulation framework. A pilot regulation period has started in 2011 and full 
application will be effective by the end of 2018. Partial adjustment models and 
variance decomposition are used for the analyses. In the analysis of the quarterly 
released financial statements of Vietnamese commercial banks in the period from 
2008/Q1 to 2015/Q4, the empirical evidence showed that throughout the period, 
lending to non-bank and high liquidity assets contributed to the adjustment in 
both long run and short run with a negative association. In addition, the loan loss 
allowance contributed to the adjustment in the post-regulation period only with 
a positive association. These highly contributing factors also show a potential 
shock after the adjustment of the interbank lending. The results imply there is a 
need for interbank lending portfolio report and an efficient control over the IRB 
of Vietnamese commercial banks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the interbank lending adjustment of Vietnamese commercial banks together with 
the pilot study recently conducted to apply the Basel framework in the Vietnamese commercial bank sector, 
and the application has been implemented since the beginning of 2011. It is important to measure the speed 
of Vietnamese commercial banks’ interbank capital adjustment while adopting this regulation requirement. 
Recently, Craig et al. (2015) stated that information from the interbank market was used  to assess the 
costs of a systemic bank failure. The interbank market is a supply channel that provides liquidity for short-
run liquidity demand of banks. Heider et al. (2015) identified that the interbank market provide benchmark 
rates for the pricing of fixed-income securities throughout the economy and are essential to banks' liquidity 
management. Additionally, Garcia-de-Andoain et al. (2016) stated that when the ECB “took over” the 
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liquidity provision role at the interbank market, it made the interbank market become under severe stress. 
These findings implied that the change at the interbank market was connected to the systemic risks. 
Vietnam is a developing country, where the economic integration is still under progress. Prior to 2000, 
all Vietnamese banks belonged to the government. At present, 36 out of 37 banks in Vietnam are joint-
stock commercial banks. The most important evolution for Vietnamese commercial banks are the Laws for 
Vietnamese credit institutions issued in 2010. Accordingly, the Basel regulation requirement is under the 
process of adoption. In the official letter number 1601/2014-NHNN/TTGSNH as of March, 17, 2014 
issued by the State Bank of Vietnam, the governor expressed that the State Bank of Vietnam intended to 
apply the full Basel regulation requirement to all Vietnamese commercial banks in 2018. The process is a 
good opportunity for an empirical analysis to study economic integration on the case of a country, where 
the Basel regulatory implementation is at the starting stage. Whereby, some findings of this article suggest 
there is a need for more disclosure and supervision of the interbank capital, since the opposite could lead 
to a systemic potential contagion via the interbank capital. 
This article uses partial adjustment models to examine the effect of relevant factors on the adjustment 
speed of interbank capital of Vietnamese commercial banks. Since 2011, Vietnamese commercial banks 
have applied some regulation requirements of the Basel framework, so the adjustment analysis also gave 
some evidence of differences in the adjustment between the pre- and post-regulation periods. Then, 
according to the contribution to the adjustment of factors, the author uses the variance decomposition 
analysis as a combination technique to detect the potential shock that might occur in the interbank contagion 
in the period from 2008/Q1 to 2015/Q4. There is evidence of shocks from the liquidity and the activation 
of a contagion mechanism from the loan loss allowance that followed the adjustment of the interbank 
lending. The study also contributes to the empirical analysis of the interbank lending by giving some relevant 
evidence in order to deepen banking regulation and to make Vietnamese commercial banking system more 
sound, transparent and prepared for further economic development. Other countries which would like to 
learn more on the experience of launching the Basel regulatory framework may find our results useful. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The economics literature used for this article focuses on the interbank capital contagion, an aspect of 
systemic contagion of bank risk. The methodologies used are the features of partial adjustment models and 
the variance decomposition analysis. 
Affinito (2012) analysed Italian bank-by-bank data of each interbank borrower and lender to assess the 
relationship between banks in the interbank market. The results showed that in Italy, the interbank customer 
relationships were stable and strong between pairs of borrowing and lending banks, persisted over time, and 
functioned well during the crisis, enabling the healthier banks to provide funds and the troubled ones to 
receive funds. Except for the rating information that used for the model fit, Affinito computed a large 
number of variables which were calculated almost on the value of transactions, assets or liabilities. However, 
the results pointed out are only relationships between banks in the interbank market and are missing the 
vision to show whether there is potential contagion in the interbank market change. 
Tian et al. (2013) developed a theoretical framework that could  identify a range of factors that 
strengthen or weaken the possibility of contagion and bailout. The choices available for so-called healthy 
bank included interbank capital. An important aspect was the amount of capital it held and the size of its 
exposure to the joint project. Contagion would occur if the bank’s capital holding was below the smaller 
amount of regulatory capital required to take over or liquidate its project. Tian et al. (2013) also concluded 
that increasing the minimum regulatory capital did not necessarily reduce contagion, while the precautionary 
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risk management inventory buffer of banks could help the bank to avoid contagion. In my article, the 
empirical analysis of the pre- and post-regulation periods is a confirmation of these conclusions in the case 
of Vietnam. Moreover, the forecast in my article is the result of the consolidation from both the theory and 
the confirmation. 
Georg (2013) proposed a dynamic multi-agent model of a banking system with the central bank. Banks 
optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserve according to their risk, return, and 
liquidity preferences. They were linked via interbank loans and face a stochastic deposit supply. Comparing 
different interbank network structures, it is shown that money-center networks were more stable than 
random networks. The evidence showed that the central bank stabilized interbank markets in the short run 
only. Systemic risk via contagion was compared with common shocks, and it was shown that both forms of 
systemic risk require different optimal policy responses. In the same line with Georg, in ’t Veld & van 
Lelyveld (2014) clarified an apparent confusion between the core periphery (CP) and nested split graph 
(NSG) models, and found a better fit of the CP model in terms of the error. These combination methods 
fitted networks on the Dutch data and made clear that the core periphery model offered a better fit to the 
interbank market. This study recognized a hierarchical structure issued for the interbank market where the 
core lending banks reserve the buffers were lower than the other ones. The findings of in ’t Veld & van 
Lelyveld (2014) highlight that the core banks faced more systemically shocks than the other ones. The 
authors also suggested doing further research for the purpose of systemic risk assessments of the interbank 
market behaviour to provide further guidelines for supervisory authorities. Besides the findings, in ’t Veld 
& van Lelyveld (2014) suggested more research on the additional of the relevant buffer factors and systemic 
shock to have better empirical  evidence.  
In order to add an empirical study to the literature  focused on developed countries mostly,  Distinguin 
et al. (2013b) analyzed an empirical disciplining role of interbank deposits of Eastern European countries 
where “stock markets and bond markets are relatively narrow and less liquid than in western countries” (see 
Distinguin et al ., 2013a). The authors found out that the market discipline had been effective in Central 
and Eastern Europe since the implementation of explicit deposit insurance. However, state-owned banks 
had not been disciplined probably because they could benefit from the implicit insurance. Based on several 
factors affecting the strength of the discipline, the authors argued that a stronger regulatory discipline could 
reduce the risk of the interbank market. In addition to the empirical analyses, Temizsoy et al. (2015) used a 
number of transactions, such as interbank rate spread and trading volume to analyse the structure of links 
between financial institutions participating in the e-MID (the only transparent electronic platform in Europe 
and the USA), an interbank market. The success of Temizsoy et al. (2015) that both lender preference index 
(LPI) and borrower preference index (BPI) could reflect the relationship of a pair bank in the interbank market 
was evident. The authors suggested that the LPI and BPI indicators should be monitored together with the 
trade volume in the interbank markets as the indicators for the early warning of a financial turmoil. The 
reminding from the conclusion of these empirical analyses, there is a need for further examination to point 
out which related indicator of the interbank capital should be followed, especially in the case of developing 
countries and where the Basel framework is applied. 
Fink et al. (2016) proposed an algorithm to model contagion in the interbank market via the credit 
quality channel, in which shocks were transmitted via asset devaluations and deteriorations in the credit 
quality. The authors developed models which could simulate the loss and the contagion of the interbank 
market in some scenarios, in which the expected losses from an increased probability of default and a new 
metric termed the banking system loss. This enabled to estimate the potential regulatory capital loss to the 
banking system due to contagion via interbank lending. Fink et al. (2016) argued that their algorithm could 
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be useful by using the information of probability of default for the contagion simulation, instrument 
calibration and policy evaluation. 
The aim of my article is to distinguish whether the VcB faces the interbank contagion risk along with 
their implementation of the SBV’s regulation requirement. The research is conducted through the analysis 
of interbank lending adjustment. This is an empirical study, a similar type to Affinito (2012), Distinguin et 
al. (2013a), in ’t Veld & van Lelyveld (2014), Temizsoy et al. (2015) and Fink et al. (2016). My study analyzes 
the interbank lending, and provides the empirical evidence of the interbank lending adjustment estimation 
and variance decomposition analysis. My article could imply some potential contagions that are related to 
the interbank lending in the case of Vietnamese commercial banks. The empirical evidence of the article 
could contribute to the interbank capital research. 
Recently, partial adjustment models have been significantly used for empirical analysis studies the 
capital structure and its adjustment. As in (Ly et al., 2017) to investigate the effect of Net Stable Funding 
Ratio adjustment speed on the systemic; Shimizu (2015) to analyze the adjustment of denominators capital 
ratio in Japanese banks; (Cook & Tang, 2010) to estimate the impact of macroeconomic factors on the 
speed of capital structure adjustment. My paper is a new study of the interbank market which could be 
added to the studies that deal with the empirical analysis by using partial adjustment models, and it is the 
first study of this topic to use the partial adjustment models in Vietnam. Additionally, Fink et al. (2016) 
proved that the change of loan loss allowance in the past could influence a contagion process. Based on the 
mechanism ideas of Fink et al. (2016), my article uses the variance decomposition analysis to distinguish the 
potential shocks, if any. This combination technique could complement the information that the partial 
adjustment models cannot occur together with the adjustments. Generally, in my article, the model is added 
a dummy variable to interact with the regressors to detect the effect of these regressors in between the two 
sub-periods. Then, the variance decomposition analysis of aggregations of the relevant indicators was used 
to search for the shock that could activate a potential contagion of the interbank capitals. 
3. METHODOLOGIES AND DATA 
To achieve the aim of my article, the procedures have two steps. Firstly, the author uses the partial 
adjustment models to analyze the adjustment speed of the interbank lending indicator. The estimation is to 
get the contribution to the adjustment speed of the effective factors. Together with the estimation, the Chaw 
test with dummy variable is conducted to detect the different effect of the regressors in the pre- and post-
regulation. The author expects that this technique could give some evidence of differences between these 
two sub-periods. The evidence from the first step could lead to the analyses to find out whether there are 
some potential contagion risks from contribution of the relevant factors. 
Secondly, the contagion is expected to occur from the relevant shock while the partial adjustment 
models cannot confirm this. Thus, following the information of the first step, the author uses the variance 
decomposition analysis to search for the potential shock that might occur from the assets portforlio analysed 
in the first step. The data for processing are the aggregate average indicators for the procedure of this step. 
Together with the process, several tests for the assumptions and consistency of the process are conducted. 
3.1. Model 
In a long-run, the interbank lending is a function of the factors that affect itself; 
2 1,n,CθXβ*Y
j
1j
ti,n,nti,j,j1ti, 

      (1) 
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Where Y is the interbank lending of bank i, the Xj are the vector of factors jth those affect the 
adjustment of the interbank lending and the Cn is control variable that respectively is in the models, t is the 
quarter point time in the period from 2008/Q1 to 2015/Q4. 
The partial adjustment model of the interbank capitals and its target: 
  ti,1-ti,ti,1-ti,ti, εY*YλYY        (2) 
Where  is the gap or speed of adjustment during a point time, (0 ≤  ≤ 1). Substituting equation (1) 
into equation (2), then a model that the speed of adjustment () is estimated as follows: 
      ti,1-ti,ti,n,n
j
1j
ti,j,jti, εYλ-1CλθXλβY 

   (3) 
In order to point out the structure break of the Xj factors in the whole period, the author divides the 
period into two sub-periods- the pre- and post-regulation periods. The dummy variables Dj are added to 
interact with the Xj vectors. D received value of 0 for the pre-regulation period and 1 for the post-regulation 
period. Equation (3) becomes: 
        ti,1-ti,ti,n,nti,j,
j
1j
ti,j,j
j
1j
ti,j,jti, εYλ-1CλθDXλβXλβY  

     (4) 
The relevance consistency tests of the partial adjustment models fitted are shown in Appendix 1. 
In order to search for potential shock, the author uses the variance decomposition analysis in the 
environment of VAR model. The relevant tests for this procedure are listed in Appendix 2. 
3.2. Variable definitions 
Until the time this article is written, the economic environment of Vietnam has not been a full market 
economy and is in the process of an integrating with the world economy.  The country has set a procedure 
to apply the Basel regulation framework into the commercial bank sector. Due to such situation, many 
economic relationships are in the integration process. The free-set interest rate approach has been applied 
in a couple of years. Foreign exchange rates and the trade of foreign exchange are fully and strictly controlled 
by the government. Derivatives have been allowed to be traded at the beginning of 2017. Therefore, in my 
article, I will exclude the relevant information on derivatives, foreign exchange rates, interest rates and some 
other related control variables. 
In the capital structure studies, the authors frequently added variables in their models those which 
represent the characteristics of firms or banks as the control variables (Ly et al., 2017;  Shimizu, 2015; Cook 
& Tang, 2010). In my paper, the natural logarithm of bank’s total assets was added as a control variable. 
This factor is called frequently SIZE and is in my models. Return on assets ratio ROA is the index also 
used as a control variable in the capital structure analysis. In my paper, the SIZE or ROA attend respectively 
the models as the control variable for the purpose of a comparison. The comparison could encourage the 
empirical control variable as in the case of Vietnamese commercial banks.   
The interbank lending variable is denoted as IBL. It is a ratio of the interbank lending divided to total 
assets. The author assumes that the probability of default of the borrowing banks in the interbank capital is 
zero. This assumption hypothesizes to the alternative analyses of regressors, especially the lending to non-
banks. 
The interbank capitals are used to provide the liquidity demand (Vollmer & Wiese, 2016; Craig et al., 
2015; Lucchetta, 2015; Alexius et al., 2014). My study follows these to enhance the systemic risk of the 
interbank capitals contagion to liquidity risk and to get the point of view regarding the liquidity risk in the 
analysis. Moreover, instead of borrowing from the interbank market, banks normally mobilize liabilities 
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from deposits of individuals as an alternative funding for liquidity demand. So, the author adds into the 
model a regressor, denoted as DEPO, a ratio of deposits on total liabilities. The association relationship of 
DEPO with the interbank lending is ambiguous, and this empirical analysis could show a case of the 
relationship of individual deposits with the interbank lending. Besides, other liabilities denoted as OLIA are 
important funds for a bank. The evidence from DEPO and OLIA might give evidence of banks’ funding 
for the purpose of their interbank lending target adjustments.  
Through network structures, the credit risk is  the important one in the interbank system (Langfield et 
al., 2014), similar to with Langfield et al. (2014) in the analysis of both the interbank lending and the 
interbank debt. My model includes a regressor for the interbank lending adjustment. This regressor denoted 
as LOAN, represents a channel of systemic contagion and is calculated by a ratio of total loans on total 
assets of banks. The author expects that the information from this regressor could help to explain the 
adjustment of the interbank lending in a negative association. 
Cash holding, short term investments and investment to securities are parts of bank’s portfolios, which 
are of a higher liquidity than long-term investments and long-term assets. A regressor added to the model, 
denoted as HLA, represents high liquidity assets. This ratio could hint a part of the liquidity demand, which 
relates to the requirement of liquidity standards of the Basel 3. The author expects to have some association 
relationship behaviors of these assets with the interbank lending of Vietnam throughout the periods. 
Following the mechanism of Fink et al. (2016), an indicator calculated by the loan loss allowances was 
divided by net loans. This indicator denoted as LLA was added to the analysis. According to Fink et al. 
(2016), an increase in the loan loss allowance leads to a decrease in the interbank lending and it activates a 
contagion shock. The presence of LLA in the models is expected to show a relevant behaviour of VcB in 
the periods. 
 
Table 1 
Variable definition 
 
Variable Definition Calculation 
IBL Interbank lending The loans that bank lends to other bank divided by total 
assets 
SIZE Size of the bank’s assets Logarithm of total assets 
ROA Return on assets ratio Net income divided by total assets 
DEPO Deposits from household 
ratio 
Total deposits from household in bank divided by total 
liabilities 
OLIA Other liabilities ratio Other liabilities divided by total liabilities 
LOAN Total loan that bank lending 
to non-bank ratio 
Total loan that bank lends to non-bank customers divided 
by total assets 
HLA High liquidity assets ratio Sum of cash holding, short term investment and the 
investment to securities divided by total assets 
LLA Loan loss allowance ratio Loan loss allowance divided by total net loan to non-bank. 
3.3. Data 
Data for the analysis are collected from the quarterly released financial statements of Vietnamese 
commercial banks which are available in the period from 2008/Q1 to 2015/Q4. In my article, the panel 
data is used for the adjustment analyses. This technique is similar to the use of data in Shimizu (2015) to 
analyze the adjustment of denominators capital ratio in Japanese banks, Cook & Tang (2010) estimated the 
impact of macroeconomic conditions on the adjustment speed of capital structure, Ly et al. (2017) 
investigated the effect of Net Stable Funding Ratio adjustment speed on the systemic one. While using the 
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variance decomposition analysis, the time series of each factor at the level of the banking industry are 
aggregated. This is a similar way that Ly et al. (2017) dealt with in their data to calculate the adjustment 
speed of Net Stable Funding Ratio, and Koch (2014) used to test the cointegration. Following the 
framework mechanism of Fink et al. (2016) to discuss the empirical evidence from the analyses, the author 
calculates the overall growth rates of the variables in the models. To distinguish whether the volatility of the 
effective factors on the adjustment speed are different in the period before and after the regulation launched, 
the whole period above is divided into two sub-periods, one is the pre-regulation period from 2008/Q1 to 
2010/Q4 and the next one is from 2011/Q1 to 2015/Q4, the post-regulation period. 
According to the framework developed by Fink et al. (2016), a longer maturity of interbank exposure 
contributes more to contagion than a short one. Unfortunately, my data set does not have the detailed 
maturities of the interbank lending. Therefore, this lacks the interbank exposure evidence to highlight an 
additional contribution to the potential contagion in the interbank lending. 
 
Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
Source: Calculated by the author 
 
Table 3 
Growth rate in the period 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
IBL 0.3030 0.2930 0.1254 0.5669 
SIZE 14.3231 14.3574 13.2705 15.0314 
ROA 0.0019 0.0019 -0.0114 0.0167 
DEPO 0.8679 0.8994 0.5790 0.9855 
OLIA 0.0689 0.0454 0.0007 0.4081 
LOAN 0.4504 0.4614 0.2029 0.6517 
HLA 0.1203 0.1125 0.0264 0.2681 
LLA 0.0171 0.0140 0.0044 0.0432 
Variable Std. Dev. C.V. Skewness Ex. Kurtosis 
IBL 0.1052 0.3472 0.3015 -0.6779 
SIZE 0.3790 0.0265 -0.6592 0.1271 
ROA 0.0020 1.0036 0.3165 24.080 
DEPO 0.0968 0.1116 -0.6547 -0.6469 
OLIA 0.0666 0.9674 1.6696 3.3739 
LOAN 0.1068 0.2372 -0.2272 -0.8869 
HLA 0.0562 0.4671 0.3061 -0.8130 
LLA 0.0083 0.4834 0.9590 0.2969 
Indicator IBL_ave DEPO_ave OLIA_ave LOAN_ave HLA_ave LLA_ave  
Average 8.44% 6.80% 38.42% 8.08% 8.09% 10.70%  
Pre-period 12.02% 8.93% 55.89% 11.27% 4.31% 14.08%  
Post-period 4.85% 4.67% 20.94% 4.88% 11.87% 7.32%  
 
Source: Calculated by the author 
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Figure 1. The plot of variables after aggregated into time series 
Source: Calculated by the author 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
My first analysis aims to detect the adjustment speed of the interbank lending. In order to achieve this 
the regression technique is used. Firstly, a model that computes the panel data is the pooled ordinary least 
square model. The result from the processing with IBL then tested the consistency. The test shows that the 
alternative models are fixed effects and random effects, in which the result of the fixed effects model shows 
a higher speed of adjustment than the one of the random effects model. A part of my intention is to 
distinguish whether the effective factors have a different effect on the interbank lending in the sub-periods. 
To do so, together with equation (4), the dummy variables are added to the pooled regression. Therefore, 
the result from the pooled regression is shown together with the result from the fixed- and random-effects 
regressions which are estimated by equation (3). The adjustment speeds of the interbank capitals in Tab 4 
show that the estimations of fixed-effects models provide a different result experiencing a higher speed than 
the random-effects models, and, the alternative model diagnostics mostly recommend fixed-effects model 
is as well. The tests for multicollinearity were also conducted and there is no evidence of any potential from 
this issue. Secondly, in order to have an overview of the growth in the periods, an average growth rate of 
the effective factors was calculated and shown in Tab 3. The information confirms that all the indicators 
increased in the whole period. Before using the VAR model, the variables are tested as shown in Appendix 2. 
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Table 4 
Regression of partial adjustment models 
 
 
In general, the figures in Tab 4 show that using different control variables gives the approximate results 
from the models fitted, in which the ROA variable is more statistically significant in the adjustment speed 
estimation and a little bit less significant in the adjustment speed in comparison with the SIZE variable. 
According to the estimation of fixed-effects models shown in Tab 4, the results indicate that in the 
adjustment of interbank lending is 92.4%, nearly complete in a quarter. This result implies that in short run, 
interbank lending absorbs mostly the effects for its adjustment. Additionally, in column (3), as expected, the 
LOAN has a negative association with IBL, and HLA gives an empirical evidence that this indicator has a 
negative association with IBL. The statistical significances of LOAN and HLA suggest that these assets 
contribute to the adjustment speed of interbank lending, and these relationships are similar in both the short 
run and the long run. Moreover, the statistical significances of the dummy variables in column (1), column 
(5) of Tab 4 and the growth in Tab 3 show that both LOAN, HLA and LLA are significant changes in their 
effects on the interbank lending between the sub-periods. A higher statistically significant of HLA’s 
coefficient and the invert effect of LLA on IBL mean that HLA strongly changes its contribution to the 
interbank lending while LLA has a positive relationship with IBL in the post-regulation period. On one 
hand, these results give evidence characteristics of relationship between LOAN, HLA, LLA and IBL. On 
Dependent variable: IBL 
 Pooled least square Fix effects Pooled least square Fix effects 
Coefficient Short 
run 
Long 
run 
Short 
run 
Long 
run 
Short 
Run 
Long 
run 
Short 
run 
Long 
Run 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable         
SIZE 0.080*** 0.100 -0.018 -0.019 - -      - - 
 [7.563]  [-1.249]       
ROA - -      -      - 5.536*** 7.697 1.636 1.784 
     [3.693]  [1.361]  
DEPO 0.439*** 0.549 0.049 0.053 0.172** 0.240 0.048 0.053 
 [5.813]  [0.858]  [2.341]  [0.845]  
OLIA 0.071 0.089 -0.019 -0.021 -0.023 -0.031 -0.020 -0.021 
 [0.842]  [-0.2900]  [-0.2468]  [-0.297]  
LOAN -0.667*** -0.833 -0.903*** -0.978 0.551*** 0.766 -0.897*** -0.979 
 [-11.44]  [-21.11]  [-9.025]  [-20.86]  
HLA -0.189** -0.236 -0.601*** -0.651 -0.179* -0.249 -0.557*** -0.607 
 [-2.145]  [-7.239]  [-1.847]  [-7.250]  
LLA -2.136*** -2.669 -0.519 -0.561 0.071 0.099 -0.421 -0.459 
 [-3.552]  [-1.143]  [0.124]  [-0.9164]  
IBLt-1 0.200*** (0.800) 0.076* (0.924) 0.281*** (0.719) 0.083** (0.917) 
 [4.900]  [1.866]  [6.569]  [2.051]  
D_OLIA -0.272 -0.340   -0.220  -0.306   
 [-3.170]    [-2.334]     
D_DEPO 0.160*** 0.200   0.003**  0.004   
 [1.371]    [0.026]     
D_LOAN -0.137** -0.172   -0.091  -0.127   
 [-2.392]    [-1.443]     
D_HLA -0.305*** -0.381   0.244**  0.339   
 [-2.820]    [-1.443]     
D_LLA 2.094*** 2.617   1.624**  2.259   
 [3.039]    [2.158]     
R-squared 0.87  0.85  0.85   0.85  
Bolded numbers in parenthesis ( ) are the values of , numbers in square parenthesis are the values of t-ratio. “***”, “**”, “*” 
are the significant at 99%, 95%, 90%. Source:  Calculated by the author 
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the other hand, the negative association of LOAN and HLA with IBL imply that the more (or less) banks 
lend to the interbank capital, the less (or more) liquidity banks get, especially in the post-regulation period, 
while association of the loan loss allowance with the interbank lending is a latent contagion. Actually, the 
growth shown in Tab 3 gives good evidence that in the post-regulation period, the growth in high liquidity 
assets is higher than the growth of the lending. Meanwhile, the growth of LLA is higher than the growth of 
IBL. 
In the long run, a high contribution of LOAN to the adjustment of interbank lending with the negative 
relationship effect explains that lending in the interbank market or lending to non-banks is a high priority 
portfolio reallocation in the pre-regulation period and then, the coefficient of LOAN’s dummy variable 
means that lending to non-banks less contributes to the adjustment in the post-regulation period. The author 
considers connecting the evidence of HLA with the findings of Lee (2013) that when the liquidity of cross 
banks is imbalanced, the interbank net-work tends to be in a systemic liquidity shortage and the banks 
become vulnerable to liquidity shocks. However, the growth of these indicators shows that there are some 
improvements of high liquidity assets in the post-regulation period. But, the variances of this indicator in 
Tab 5 show that the shock occurs right after the first quarter and stays on the same level in the following 
quarters. 
The results of DEPO in column (3) and column (5) of Tab 4 made me support the findings of Vollmer 
& Wiese (2016) about one way effect of the deposits on the interbank lending having a positive association. 
These results of this indicator also give evidence to support the corollary of Cañón & Margaretic (2014) that 
deposits from household could have a positive relationship with the interbank lending. 
 
Table 5 
Decomposition of variance for IBL_Ave 
Endogenous variables in VAR model: IBL_ave, HLA_ave, LLA_ave, LOAN_ave 
period std. error IBL_ave HLA_ave LLA_ave LOAN_ave 
1 0.0921931 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0.118464 68.2745 27.8800 2.7320 1.6167 
3 0.124645 64.8666 27.0483 7.0247 1.4911 
4 0.135795 59.4363 25.1407 10.0553 2.0682 
5 0.169573 51.4003 31.8786 11.6298 2.7725 
6 0.180718 47.8846 28.0683 13.1874 2.8183 
7 0.186408 46.6400 26.4531 16.6924 5.2982 
8 0.216034 34.7358 21.0511 36.5274 6.9933 
9 0.243403 28.7233 19.5430 45.1325 6.4956 
10 0.260975 25.3209 19.1391 47.9744 5.7814 
Source: Calculated by the author 
 
 
Figure 2. The impulse responses of IBL_Ave 
Source: Calculated by the author 
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Tab 5 and Fig 2 display the shocks effect on IBL_ave and the impulse of this variable. The forecast 
shows the potential shock. The HLA-ave_is the soonest and highest shock on IBL_ave in only one quarter 
lag. After that, from the quarter fourth of lags, LLA_ave indicator is ascending effect on the fluctuation of 
IBL then become strongest in the quarter tenth of lags. 
5. DISCUSSION 
A higher adjustment speed estimation given by the SIZE variable or the ROA variable when they are 
respectively control variables could tell that the interbank capital of Vietnamese commercial banks is less 
sensitive with the ROA. This result is similar to the result of the ROA variable in Ly et al. (2017), in the 
developed countries, where the ROA is affected by many factors. When comparing the bank efficiency in 
Austria and the Czech Republic, Svitalkova (2014) argued that the sources of the bank inefficiency in Austria 
are personnel costs and high broker provisions. In the case of Vietnam, the empirical analysis above showed 
that a tight control of the SBV on interest rates until 2014 was the main reason why the interbank market 
did not reflect the real market prices. Thus, the interbank capital of Vietnamese commercial banks was less 
sensitive with the ROA. 
All banks’ balance sheets consist of assets and liabilities. Every interbank asset is another bank’s 
liabilities. If a bank has its customer insolvency, this bank still has an obligation to pay to its lender banks in 
the interbank market. On the one hand, to repay the debt, the borrowers in the interbank market must 
reduce their assets, use their own liabilities or combine both. On the other hand, when the insolvency of 
some non-bank lenders increases, the loan loss allowance would increase as well. The liquidity that banks 
cover for the solvency moves out of a banking system, banks would experience less liquidity. However, in 
the meantime, some other banks could have surplus liquidity from their mobilizing activities and they could 
lend such surplus liquidity to other banks which are in need of both their clients’ payoff and their own 
liquidity requirement. In all cases, this activity also makes the potential contagion of interbank capital 
become more serious. Eisenschmidt & Tapking (2009) showed that lenders, who face funding problems 
themselves or who wish to hold precautionary liquidity buffers, may refrain from lending to other financial 
institutions. In order to implement the regulation requirements, a bank has the loan loss tolerance rate 
increasing, leading to the lending cutoff in both the interbank market and non-bank borrowers. In addition, 
according to Jackson et al. (1999), in some periods after the capital regulation, banks in a particular country 
may find some shortfalls in lending because of the capital regulation requirements which could lead to the 
lending cutback. This means that in the post-regulation period, the interbank lending may have a reduction. 
Garcia-de-Andoain et al. (2016) and Craig et al. (2015) believed that the interbank market is a supply channel 
that provides liquidity for short-run liquidity demand of banks. From these points of view, the empirical 
evidence could interpret that the change in the interbank market in Vietnam is connected with the system 
risk. Additionally, the banks with a lower liquidity quality and a higher loan loss tolerance have more 
vulnerable financial position, and these banks are more likely to be affected by the regulation.  
Assuming that the network runs in the same mechanism of the Fink et al. (2016) framework, in which 
an increase of the loan loss allowance reflects 100% of the lost event incurred from loans, these effects 
increase the expected credit losses in the banking sector. As a positive reaction of the capital management, 
the lending banks have to reallocate their portfolios in the next periods and drive a contagion process which 
is driven by the interbank lending channel. Tab 5 and Fig 2 display the shocks effect on IBL_ave and the 
impulse of this variable, in which the LLA_ave indicator has an ascending effect on the fluctuation of IBL 
from the fourth quarter and becomes strongest in the tenth quarter. In the same situation of the macro and 
microeconomics, the evidence shows that the contagion from the interbank lending might occur after one 
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year from the change in LLA_ave. On the other hand, the change of these assets are depended on the 
borrowing banks’ internal ratting based (IRB), the most used method of Vietnamese commercial bank 
sector, Blum (2008) and Cipovova & Belas (2012) also took into account the risks from these mechanisms.  
The empirical evidence and forecast above provide a scenario that in the post-regulation period, banks 
with lower liquidity and hit by the increase in their loans loss allowance are in the earlier potential contagion 
position, which could cause a reduction in the provision of interbank lending. 
 Moreover, the loan write-up provision to the total net loans ratio implies the risk of loans’ portfolio 
on the assets of a bank. The higher the risks of loans, the higher the credit risks bank would face, and banks 
expose themselves to a higher leverage. A further empirical analysis of these relationships could give more 
evidence of the contagion via the interbank market. 
6. CONCLUSION 
From the interbank lending adjustment analyses of Vietnamese commercial banks in the pre- and post-
regulation period, the author finds out that the high quality assets is the most contributing factor in the short 
run. While lending to non-banks contributes with the same level in both short and long run, in the post-
regulation period; its contribution is lower. In the post-regulation period, the loan loss tolerance has an 
inverted contribution effect and the highest positive association with the adjustment of the interbank 
lending. These trend signals are good for the healthy portfolios in the post-regulation period. 
The analyses give evidence that to adjust the interbank lending, the process needs a negative association 
of lending to non-banks and the high liquidity assets; there is evidence that the deposit is positively 
associated with the adjustment of interbank lending in both pre- and post-regulation periods, while the loan 
loss allowance has an inverted association. Consequently, assuming that the condition of the post-regulation 
is stable, the adjustment of interbank lending could face a shock in the decrease of high liquidity assets 
which occur from the second quarter. Meanwhile, the shock of the loan loss tolerance could occur after a 
year mostly. 
The evidence also points out the fact that it is necessary to add some more disclosure details of the 
interbank lending portfolios’ maturities and straighten monitoring of the IRB of Vietnamese commercial 
banks as the action to control better the potential risk that might occur from the interbank lending. 
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